Introduction
The recent death of the controversial journalist and author, Christopher Hitchens, has been widely lam ented. Hitchens had become a celebrated public intellectual and devoted 'contrarian' , who made a reputation in part by being willing to challenge the reputations of public figures such as Bill Clinton, Henry Kissinger and Mother Theresa. In his later years Hitchens became most famous for his willing ness to take on 'God' as he became a leading figure within the 'New Atheist' movement. Even Hitchens' own terminal illness would become (as he himself described it) 'an Event' as it provoked public debate concerning how atheists may approach the assumed finality of physical death. In many ways Hitchens might be taken to have personified the uncomprom ising attitude of new atheists towards religion, which he argued arises 'from the bawling, fearful infancy of our species ' (2007: 64) . New atheism is best known as a literary and media phenomenon, being particularly associated with the publication of a range of bestsell ing books in the UK, US and elsewhere (e.g. Dawk ins 2006, Harris 2004 , Dennett 2006 , Harris 2008 , Hitchens 2007 , Loftus 2008 , Barker 2008 , Stenger 2008 , Onfray 2008 . It has attracted attention due to its forceful challenges to religious doctrines and beliefs and its use of provocative argument and rhetoric to question the value of religions, particular ly Christianity and Islam. Some have welcomed new atheism as a timely questioning of religious power in response to a putative 'desecularisation' of world pol itics. On the other hand, new atheism has also drawn fierce criticism from defenders of religious faith, who not only doubt the intellectual strength of new athe ism, but also criticise what they consider to be un justifiably excessive rhetoric that could harm public debate. The article will argue that what is perhaps most distinctive about new atheism is its political character. It is proposed that the roots of new athe ism lie in political grievances concerning what are perceived to be unjustifiably privileged roles for re ligion in both public and private life. Although there has been much discussion of the aggressive charac ter of new atheism, and considerable effort devoted to highlighting what critics perceive as its errors or omissions (Amarasingam 2010) , less time has been spent examining the particular ways it challenges re ligious power and legitimacy. This paper seeks to ar ticulate the multifaceted ways in which new atheism challenges religious authority through making use of relevant theories of power. 1
Characterising new atheism-core arguments
The term 'new atheism' appears to have been first pub licly used in 2006 in an edition of the US magazine Wired. The coverfeature article discussed the publi cation of a spate of books arguing against religion, fo cussing on the work of Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett (Wolff 2006) . Since this time the term has been used more widely to include other au thors, including that of the physicist Victor Stenger, the French philosopher Michel Onfray and the work of two former evangelical Christians, Dan Barker and John Loftus. New atheism is also taken now to refer to a range of prominent individuals, including many journalists and atheist networks of activists. This first section of this paper attempts to set out the broad as sumptions and stances of new atheism. In so doing, it should be acknowledged that this involves conflat ing the views of a range of different authors who each have their own emphases and subject specialisms. The aim is to set out basic propositions to which most if not all of those authors identified as 'new atheist' tend to adhere to:
1. There is probably no God. In 2009 the socalled 'atheist bus campaign' was launched in the UK by the comedian Arianne Sherine and Richard Dawkins. The campaign was intended to counter the Christian adverts sometimes placed on London buses by evan gelical organisations. The chosen campaign slogan -'There is Probably No God: Now Stop Worrying and Enjoy Your Life' -attracted attention, particularly through the inclusion of the word 'probably' which surprised some commentators given the strong conviction of new atheists that belief in God is mis placed. Yet this is indeed the position of almost all new atheist authors, who justify their lack of belief in God based on an apparent lack of scientific evidence that one might exist. They argue that there is no good evidential basis to indicate existence of the kind of The difficulty with this position, new atheists argue, is that it then weakens our ability to challenge highly dangerous religious beliefs. The belief that by killing apostates you will be rewarded in heaven may be a far more distasteful and hazardous belief to hold than belief in the virgin birth of Jesus. Yet it is not, for many atheists at least, any less plausible a claim. Thus for new atheists the difficulty with moderate re ligion is that it establishes the convention of leaving religious beliefs unquestioned, thereby increasing the probability that extreme religious views will similarly not be sufficiently challenged. Dawkins (2006) com ments that if the defenders of apartheid in South Af rica had been more astute they would have sought to have given racial separation a religious justifica tion. If they had, it is suggested that the cause of anti apartheid campaigners could have been yet harder due to a greater reluctance to challenge religious as opposed to political views. (2007) detects a large degree of 'testosterone driven' posturing in de bates concerning new atheism in which the agenda of the protagonists appears primarily to be to boost egos and pointscore. 4 The literature taking issue with new atheism tends to focus upon the perceived weaknesses of its argu ments against God and their misunderstanding of religious traditions more generally. Such critics tend not to deal with the more political implications of new atheism, save in a couple of important respects. New atheists tend to underscore tendencies within some monotheistic traditions towards (for example) homophobia and the oppression of women, drawing attention to how unacceptable people will ordinarily find such attitudes in Western secular societies and elsewhere. Defenders of faith tend to grant the prob lematic nature of these particular strands of thought, but point to wider traditions which dovetail much more readily with secular and liberal values. Also, some critics of new atheism argue that widespread 'Godlessness' may not have the benign outcomes which Dawkins et al. suppose, but rather may open the door to the kinds of crimes against humanity which occurred in officially atheist and communist regimes. The idea that moves away from religion will produce liberating social and political effects (as tends to be assumed by new atheists) is disputed by commentators who fear that in a fully atheist soci ety there may be fewer constraints upon the worst features of human nature. The political philosopher John Gray (himself nonreligious) argues that new atheism itself is an unconscious product of late Chris tianity, inheriting both the humanist values emerging from the Christian faith, but also is a distorted ver sion of its belief in 'salvation in history ' (2009 2010: 129) . Whilst the historical impact of atheism is con tested within these debates, critics of new atheism tend not to respond directly to the more immediate political concerns of the new atheists. Issues such as the perceived discrimination against atheists in schools admissions policies,pop or the privileged sta tus for religious representatives within institutions or policymaking processes tend not to be particularly discussed. The implied position appears to be that if the new atheists can be shown to be fundamentally wrong in their appraisal of the role of religion in soci ety, then this will in turn undermine the more specific arguments made by new atheists on practical issues. At the same time, academic studies of new atheism tend to focus on the scientific, sociological and theo logical arguments surrounding it rather than the pol itical dimensions (though these are sometimes men tioned in passing).
'Tina Beattie has criticised both new atheists and many of their opponents for engaging in 'testosterone driven'posturing.
New atheism?
Atheism itself has a long and complex history. The task of tracing the history of atheism is compli cated by the fact that it is often difficult to distinguish athe ism (absence of belief in God) with dissent from the established religious authorities of the day. Also, when discussing public figures or intellectuals who were hostile to religion, it is sometimes a matter of debate regarding whether they were atheists as op posed to deists (McGrath & 2004) . Certainly some of the atheism which emerged in eighteenthcentury France had a strongly political dimension, as it was directed in opposition to the power of the domin ant Catholic Church. The later strands of atheism that developed through Marxism and Communism viewed religion as (in part at least) an instrument of rulingclass domination which should be politic ally opposed. However, intellectual ly, the atheism of the eighteenth/nineteenth/twentieth centur ies was dominated by Enlightenment thought and the devel opment of the natural and social sci ences. Many key thinkers viewed religion as being rooted in traditions of superstition which were ignorant of the material bases of natural phenomena. The general assumption was that religions would, and certainly should, fade away over time and be replaced by scientific under standing and secular approaches to political organ isation. For much of the time atheism in the West was a position which was most directly influential in sec tions of academia. Many political activists (particu larly on the Left) may have been atheists, but this was arguably of little direct significance in their activities and they would often work alongside people of faith.
How then does one explain the rise and popular ity of radical forms of atheism in the early twenty first century? An obvious stimulus to the new atheism was the attack on the United States on 9/11, which is cited directly by Harris, Dawkins and Hitchens as a key factor in emboldening them to challenge religion more directly. For such authors there could be no clearer example of the dangers of allowing irrational and extremist beliefs to flourish than that provided by the suicidal mission of nineteen men in the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001. Both the in fluence of the Christian Right on American politics under George W. Bush, as well high levels of support for antiscientific creationist beliefs in the US were factors which further alarmed atheists. More general ly the global failure of religion to decline in the man ner forecasted by many earlier intellectual groups engendered a sense amongst nonbelievers than they could not simply sit back and hope that the 'forces of history' would sweep religion away. Even so, the sheer popularity of new atheist texts took most com mentators by surprise. It appeared that new atheist messages were giving voice to social and political concerns which had, to some degree, been hitherto underrepresented.
Thus, one of the most distinctive aspects of new atheism is indeed its political character. It is a per spective which is not content to leave atheism as a passive set of private beliefs. New atheism is deter mined that what it considers the unfair institu tional, political and social advantages held by religious groups should be challenged. In many ways it is the takenforgrantedness surrounding the position of religion in society and the polity which it believes must be questioned. The remainder of this paper at tempts to provide a characterisation of the politics of new atheism.
Challenging religious power
Confronting the issue of how new atheists challenge religious power requires using concepts of 'power' it self. Often enough, contemporary theorists speak of power as containing three, or even four 'dimensions' . These positions follow in the tradition of Stephen Lukes's 1974 classic text Power: A Radical View. Fol lowing Robert Dahl, Lukes originally defined power as 'the ability of A to get B to do something B would not otherwise do' . Lukes argued that power could be found in the three dimensions of decision-making; agenda-setting and preference-shaping. Power can be expressed in decisionmaking contexts where one set of interests or opinions can prevail over the in terests or views of others. However, power can also be exercised through influencing what is, or is not, decided about in the first place. Through agendaset ting, some groups may have their interests privileged within institutional processes (just as other interests may be excluded). Lukes describes his proposed third dimension of power as the most 'insidious' since it involves the ability of groups to manipulate or mis lead others into adopting beliefs which run counter to their true interests:
is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have -that is, to secure their compli ance by controlling their thoughts and desires? … [I]s it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? (Lukes 1974: 23-4.) This concept of threedimensional power has proved controversial as it suggests individuals or groups can be manipulated to the extent that they will actually adopt preferences that will suit the interests of others (Haauguard 2002) . It also raises the difficult question of how one might identify a group's 'real' or 'true' in terest in the first place (Bradshaw 1994 , Hay 2002 ). However, it will be suggested below that new atheists do indeed identify what they consider to be power re lations in which religious ideas are used to prejudice the interests of individuals or groups.
Much of the literature on power engages critic ally with Lukes's perspective and it is now widely accepted that whilst his threedimensional view is plausible and empirically applicable, it nonetheless adopts a narrow view of power (Morriss 2002 , Clegg 1979 . Lukes is considered to deal largely with rela tions of domination, to the exclusion of other types of power, including wider processes of social construc tion. Peter Digeser (1992) suggests that limitations of Lukes's threedimensional view can be addressed if the theory is combined with the kind of concep tualisation of power developed by Michel Foucault. Indeed Digeser suggests we could regard Foucault as in effect providing a fourth dimension of power. 5 Foucault suggests that rather than viewing agents be ing something given which are acted upon by power, we should view agents as themselves being produced by power (Hoy 1986) . Attention is thus focused on how agents, or subjects, are shaped by institutional or social norms and practices. So, rather than treat ing groups or individuals as having given or fixed in terests, a Foucauldian perspective seeks to trace the ways in which subjectivities are constructed through innumerable social, political and institutional prac tices. This allows for an investigation of the ways in which power can produce negative and/or positive 5 It could be argued that the Foucault's and Lukes's positions ought not to be combined in this way due to what are the arguably different epistemological/ ontological assumptions that guide the respective au thors. For instance, it might be argued that Foucault's perspective would not permit interests to be treated as 'givens' in the way they arguably are in Lukes's work. In any case, the purpose of this article is not to assess such theories as such but rather to use them as heuristic in teasing out the character of new atheist stances.
effects and does not necessarily imply that power re lations will be determined by the intended actions of individuals or groups. The discussion below will util ize this 'fourth dimension' to help articulate the new atheist approach to religion. The possibility of having an allelected second chamber is currently being considered in parliamentary commit tee alongside proposals which would see the number of bishops reduced from twentysix to twelve. 6 The Church of England is keen that bishops be retained as a way of (amongst other things) recognising the special nature of the church-state relationship in the UK. A further possibility is that representatives of other faith groups could also take up appointed places in the reformed House of Lords. This would reduce the Church of England's privilege over other large faith organisations. Yet it would maintain the principle that new atheists object to, which is that religious groups should be accorded special influ ence within secular decisionmaking. However, the attitude of new atheists towards the House of Lords reform is only part of a wider political agenda which is to see that matters of religious faith be considered exclusively private concerns. In other words, religion should not impinge directly upon political processes, which ought, it is argued, to be purely secular. The British state should, therefore, not give religious groups power in legislative decisionmaking, still less should it preferentially incorporate the views of one particular faith. It is of course accepted that individ uals with religious beliefs will participate fully in the polity, but it is contended that when such individuals make arguments for particular decisions these must be presented in secular terms. The Church of England has responded to this kind of argument, indeed the 2011 church report 'Challenges for the New Quinquennium' (Challenges 2011) argued that vindicating the positive role of the church in Britain was 'partly about taking on the new atheism' . More generally, it was argued that the Church must resist those who wish to treat religion as a 'social problem' and attempts to treat faith as some thing which should not impact on the public realm. The Church is committed to ensuring that it has 'a special place within the constitution and continues to have a special contribution to make to the life of the nation' .
b. Agenda-setting. New atheists are concerned about the ability of religious groups to influence the politic al agenda, and worry that this can lead to excessive attention being devoted to topics which may not of themselves be of priority to the general public. For instance, in the UK a concern of new atheists and secular campaigning groups has been the efforts by recent governments to extend the use of faith schools; that is to say schools which are administered by par ticular religious groups rather than local authorities. It is alleged that the Church of England is seeking to extend its influence over school education in part due to its declining influence in other aspects of so cial life. New atheists also fear that the segregation of young children at a young age by religious group ing is likely to exacerbate social tensions that exist in British society. Faced with the general acceptance of the idea that parents ought to be able to choose faith schools for children if they so wish (and indeed the popularity of faith schools with many parents, often including nonreligious families) radical atheists of ten ask that the systemic effect of such individuals choices should be examined. Furthermore, the cu mulative effect of establishing ever greater numbers of faith schools, which usually preferentially admit pupils from parents of particular faiths, is to discrim inate against pupils of parents without a religious faith. For ex ample, children of atheist parents may find themselves disadvantaged when applying for schools places if they happen to live in areas where several of the available schools are faith schools.
There is also the allegation that this situation fosters and encourages insincerity and dishonesty within the school system where thousands of parents will affect to have a religious persuasion they do not in fact have, or may even have their children baptised, merely in order to help secure their child a place at a particular statefunded school. These are the kinds of issue over which there is arguably social 'irritability' that is rarely reflected within partypolitical debate in the UK and which atheist campaigners thus have the opportunity to articulate. The perception is that the elites of both political parties and religious groups have had a mutual interest in forwarding faithbased agendas (which do not necessarily equate with the wider public interest). Indeed, under both New La bour's 'third way' and the Conservatives' 'Big Soci ety' governments have continued to look for ways to use the civic resources supplied by religious organi sations in delivering policy. This trend has alarmed atheists who fear that nonreligious public sector workers may face discrimination as services become transferred to faith organisations who can obtain exemptions from aspects of equalities legislation in their appointment practices. It has also raised fears that faithbased organisations may exploit their posi tion as service providers to proselytise.
It is notable that within the many responses to new atheism there are few direct replies to this kind of criticism. Certainly there have been many strong defences of faith schools which argue that the so cial goods produced by such schools (e.g. discipline; strong moral values; an embedded sense of commu nity) outweigh disadvantages, and that this is also evidenced in the strong academic performance of children at these schools. The relative disadvantage of nonreligious (or other religious) affiliation faced by parents seeking places at good schools for their children is rarely addressed, save rather indirectly in the championing of 'choice' for parents. The attitude of government has generally been that regulation of service provision should be sufficient to ensure that secular interests are not jeopardised by involving reli gious groups in delivering public policy. Faith groups themselves tend to stress their religious commitment to the general social good, not just to members of their Church. The dominant attitude appears to be that radical atheists and secularists have a doggedly unsympathetic view of organised religion which dis torts their view of issues such as faith schools and places them at odds with wider public opinion. c. Preference-shaping. As new atheists believe that there is no 'afterlife' , they argue the most significant thing about religion is the power it wields in the here andnow. A particular concern is the way in which they believe religious myths are propagated in ways which in effect accord power and privilege to some actors over others. A clear example is in the educa tion of children. In acknowledging that children of a young age are likely to absorb and believe much of what adults relay to them, new atheists are con cerned about the way religion is taught in public schools. Hitchens (2007) and Dawkins (2006) have courted controversy in arguing that the religious indoctrin ation of children can actually be a form of 'child abuse' . They argue that children can be intro duced to sets of belief about the world which may be deeply frightening to them and may subsequently af fect their abilities as adults to approach the world in a rational way. For example, they question whether it is reasonable to encourage a child to behave in cer tain ways by invoking the belief that if they do not they risk an eternity of torture in hell when they die. Richard Dawkins has expressed concern that within some Muslim schools in particular creationist theor ies about the origins of humanity are being taught in preference to theories of evolution. New atheists, along with many others also express concern about the authority conferred on religious figures through the teaching of religion. They argue that the scandals concerning widespread paedophilia in the Catholic Church arose in part because of the fear children would have in speaking out against their abusers in a context where those figures held huge public respect.
In this area again the critics of new atheism will often insist that they offer an unfair or inaccurate picture of the way religious ideas are actually taught. Defenders of faith often take particular exception to the idea that religious ideas are taught to children as a kind of 'power play' to confer institutional au thority rather than as an authentic attempt to guide children in ways to help them cope with the experi ences of life and develop their moral intuitions. Most religious believers accept theories of evolution and it is argued new atheists greatly exaggerate the excep tions to this general rule. It is argued that Dawkins's and Hitchens's crude portrayals of notions of hell say more about their own theological ignorance than about what is actually taught to children in schools. Again, it is not only representatives of religious groups who will defend the role of religious values in society. Most recently the UK Prime Minister, David Cameron called for people to stand up and defend and promote Christian values (2011). In response to what he called 'a slow motion moral collapse' in the UK (signalled by the summer riots in 2011) he called for the championing of the Christian values of 'responsibility, hard work, charity, compassion, humility, selfsacrifice, love, pride in working for the common good and honouring the social obligations we have to one another, to our families and our com munities' . In the past Cameron has said that his own Anglican faith 'comes and goes' and some interpreted his speech as political pandering to Christian inter ests. However, on another reading his speech has been taken as an example of the common attitude that whether or not one personally believes in God, one should still recognise the force and desirability of Christian values. More cynically, some new atheists perceive such examples as instances of the political leaders using religious values as tools for guiding or disciplining the 'masses' , whom they fear may other wise slip further into feral behaviour.
d. The 'fourth' face of power. Foucault's discussions of power draw attention to the ways in which power is not just something imposed or embraced by subjects, but also constitutive of subjects themselves. Thus whilst we discuss the power of ' A over B' , we also need to consider how power relations have 'produced' A and B. Foucault draws our attention to the ways be haviour is formally and informally regulated by insti tutions, codes of conduct or broader discourses such as those surrounding gender. New atheists highlight some of the kinds of 'micropractices' through which religion regulates behaviour, some of which, they ar gue, have effects which are injurious to religious sub jects. New atheists reference the ways in which many religious practices appear to accord women a sec ondclass status, and which in effect disempower and marginalise the female gender. The forced wearing of burkas or veils is a topical example, yet the wider picture is one in which the male leaders of some re ligious groups seek to perpetuate a patriarchal social order, which can lead to forced marriages and, in the extreme, the 'honour' killing of women.
The role of the Catholic Church came under scru tiny in late 2010 following controversy surrounding Pope Benedict's state visit to the UK. Points of conten tion included the question of whether British taxpay ers (only a minority of whom are Roman Catholic) should be expected to pay for the trip. More generally the issue was raised of whether it was correct to accord the Pope the honour of a state visit in the context of child abuse scandals within the Church. New atheists again raised the question of why a religious organisa tion should be given 'special' status-asking whether a political party, business or trade union would not suffer far greater criticism if child abuse cases had oc curred in their institutions. Dawkins and Hitchens even raised the question of whether the Pope could be arrested upon his UK visit following allegations that he knew of child abuse cases but did not report them to the relevant authorities (Telegraph 2010). In deed the Pope's visit did provoke a largescale protest demonstration in London and media coverage prior to the Pope's arrival did give considerable airtime to critics of the Vatican. Such fierce opposition did not go unnoticed by senior Catholic figures. On the eve on the Pope's arrival his aide Cardinal Kasper pulled out of the trip after comparing the UK to a developing country. He also alleged that Britain was in the grip of 'an aggressive new atheism' which led to discrimin ation against Christians. British atheists were further antagonised by Pope Benedict's first speech in the UK in which he appeared to blame the crimes of the Nazis on 'atheist extremism' . The Pope was dir ectly trying to give warning of what he thought may hap pen if God and religion are pushed out of public life, arguing that this could lead 'ultimately to a truncated vision of man and of society and thus a reductive vi sion of the person and his destiny' (Ratzinger 2010) . Considerable media debate followed on the long standing question of whether Hitler and the Nazis were atheists or Christians and whether Godlessness and/or Christian antisemitism were key factors in explaining the Holocaust (Dawkins 2010) . The Pope also attacked 'aggressive secularism' which he argued fostered lack of tolerance towards religious groups. Thus far this paper has focused on new atheism's criticism of reli gions' allegedly privileged role in the public sphere. The political at tack of new atheism on religion develops with attempts to chal lenge religion in the private sphere. Whilst many atheists wish to see religion marginalised in the public sphere, they are often content to leave individuals to exercise faith in their private lives. New atheists fully concur that religious people have full rights to practise religion privately and hold religious beliefs. However, they believe that in order to reduce the harms religion can produce it is also legitimate to discourage religious belief, or at least to question it, in private contexts.
Here new atheists perceive the need to challenge the micropractices, social conventions and informal 'rules' which they believe can work to the benefit of religion. In this regard they have sought to learn les sons from the approaches of both feminists and gay rights campaigners. 7 Feminists argued that the difficulties women ex perienced in their daily lives (such as domestic vio lence) were often selfunderstood as 'personal' issues, which were rooted either in their own personality or the contingent nature of relationships they were in. Feminists perceived it as important that women should become aware of the widespread, perhaps systematic nature of problems afflicting women. This could potentially be achieved through processes of 'consciousnessraising' (Sarachild 1978) . Through discussion and campaigning women could come to perceive their own experience as part of a wider picture of sex discrimination that was perpetuated through dominant cultural attitudes and political institutions. One example concerned the use of lan guage, and the argument that everyday expressions 7 Alas there is insufficient space here to detail the tac tics influenced by gay rights campaigners. However two are of importance, (i) the tactic of 'outing'-en couraging gay people/atheists to publicly declare their identity and thus help make these identities more socially accepted; (ii) the tactic of claiming terms (e.g. the phrase 'gay' in order to give them a positive identity). Dawkins and Dennett support campaigns for atheists to selfidentify themselves as 'Brights' , on the basis than this term can help give atheists a more positive, upbeat image.
could be 'gendered' in ways which, often unwittingly, might reinforce stereotypes concerning the appropri ate roles for men and women, for example terms such as 'chairman' . New atheists have taken lessons from feminist consciousnessraising about language. 8 For example, Dawkins suggests that the special status accorded to religious beliefs is reflected in some common lan guage use (2006: 338) . For example, a child who has parents who are Roman Catholic in their religious beliefs, and who is sent to a Catholic school at age six, is often referred to as a 'Catholic child' . Yet Dawkins asks in what sense it is legitimate to label a sixyear old child a 'Catholic' , when at this stage of their life the child can have grasped little of Catholic theology, let alone reflected on how far they wish to endorse it. He points out that we would be unlikely to label the child of Marxist parents as a 'Marxist child' . Sam Harris makes a potentially more farreaching argu ment concerning our attitudes to everyday discus sions about religious belief. Harris (2004) calls for 'new rules of conversation' which discard the social convention that it is offlimits to challenge someone's religious beliefs. He suggests that there are few if any other areas of popular discourse in which such 'rules' apply. For instance, if an individual expresses views on geography, science, or politics which others disa gree with, they are likely to be challenged on these. Harris challenges what he sees as a culture of political correctness surrounding religious faith, which means that the beliefs and practices of religion are not sub ject to the same process of rational scrutiny that ap ply to most other areas of life. It also runs the risk of offering similar protection to the views of religious extremists whose views it is in everybody's interest to challenge. Yet even leaving aside such cases, new atheists argue it is unfair to treat religious beliefs as being in a special category. After all, they argue, secu lar beliefs, such as political ideologies of humanist philosophies may be just as precious, important and even 'sacred' to some individuals as religious beliefs are to others. Yet when discussing others' religious beliefs it is commonly expected that we should re spect those beliefs, no matter how implausible we might personally find them. Instead Harris calls for a 'conversational intolerance' towards beliefs (of what ever kind) which seem to confound our own sense of what is reasonable. Far from this being disrespectful to the religious believer, it is actually respectful in as much as it is treating them as reasoning adults who should be willing to defend or discuss their beliefs. New atheists suggest that the lack of such 'conversa tional intolerance' helps explain why, for example, so many people appear to accept creationist accounts of the origins of humankind.
Conclusion
The analysis above suggests that new atheism's chal lenge to religious power is multifaceted and (in principle at least) farreaching. When emphasising the political aspects of radical atheism, it is perhaps important to highlight the extent to which the ap proach and style of new atheists is selfconsciously chosen as a political means of advancing their cause. For example, in interview Dawkins has admitted that some of his rhetoric (e.g. labelling religious believ ers as 'faithheads') is 'mischievous' and 'pushes the envelope' (Dennett 2004) . However, this use of words is defended as 'a point of political tactics' (Dawkins 2011) . Similarly, Hitchens and Harris have defended their own militant language against religion as (in part) a means of raising the profile of antireligious arguments and placing these on the public agenda in a way which could probably not be achieved by more 'moderate' methods. One reading of the new atheism is to understand it as a social/political movement in its early stages, during which it is not uncommon for activists to believe that the only way they can begin to seriously advance their cause is by making pro vocative gestures that test the boundaries of normal conventions of public debate. In other words, new atheists may believe that an atheist approach which is finely nuanced and contains many caveats, footnotes and qualifications is likely to be politically ineffective. Thus they make attacks on religion that are simplified and at times deliberately crude or rude. If this inter pretation is correct, the new atheists may be vulner able to the criticism that they make use of scientific authority to present what are knowingly tactical ar guments. However, the calculation is that whilst their style may bring much criticism and derision, it may ultimately change debates on religion in similar ways to that which radical feminist and gay rights activists managed to alter the discussion of gender and sexu ality. Enduring being labelled as 'strident' and 'shrill' might be seen a rite of passage in this regard. Certain ly the critics of new atheism have successfully per suaded many that this kind of radical antireligious approach risks damaging the positive social effects that religion can produce. More generally it has been argued that new atheism misrepresents or misleads people in its presentation of religion. However, the critics tend not to respond so much to new atheism as a political phenomenon, but rather seek to knock down its attacks on 'God' or its alleged caricatures of religious traditions. There are markedly fewer attempts to understand new atheism as in part ex pressing political resentments which concern institu tionalised roles for religion. In turn, this means that responses to new atheism can be less robust than they might be. New atheism criticises the influence and power of religion in diverse ways, yet responses from religious advocates usually dwell only upon aspects of these challenges. Similarly religious scholars and theologians have a tendency to assess new atheism as if their arguments were being presented for review in an academic journal rather than for popular con sumption. This might well be considered a legitim ate response since new atheists sometimes make use of their academic authority when presenting their arguments. New atheists are often admonished for presenting an intellectually unsatisfying version of atheism which compares less well to the rigour of some atheist philosophers of the past. This observa tion may not be unjustifiable, yet it arguably misses some of the intention of new atheism. Evaluating new atheism purely by the standards of academic conven tion may prove no more productive than a political theorist who, say, assesses David Cameron's theory of 'the Big Society' against the academic standards of esteemed rightwing philosophers such as Michael Oakeshott or Fredrich Von Hayek. The 'Big Society' may lack a rigorous philosophical grounding, yet like the new atheism, it is designed with a purposive political agenda in mind rather than making major new additions to scholarly debate. The debate be tween new atheists and religious advocates is often understood as an irredeemably hostile and ultimately rather sterile one. Yet if new atheism is understood in more political terms, comparisons with develop ments in gender relations would suggest that these conflicts and dialogues can actually produce tangible longterm benefits.  Dr Stuart McAnulla is a Lecturer in Politics at the University of Leeds. He has published in several areas including: the politics of New Labour and the UK Coalition; con temporary political leadership; and social science metatheory . Email: S.D.McAnulla(at)leeds.ac.uk.
